Stablecoins are Broken
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This section only pertains to decentralized stablecoins that are backed by a collateralized basket of crypto assets, rather than those that are centrally issued or algorithmic.
Decentralized stablecoins often employ overly complex designs in their systems like peg stability modules, governance structures, and upgradable proxy contracts. However, it's worth questioning whether all of these functions are truly necessary. With so many moving parts, the potential for vulnerabilities increases and the protocol becomes more difficult to maintain.
Decentralized stablecoins often fall short of the decentralization many believe them to have. Some of the most popular decentralized stablecoins are backed by centralized collateral.
30% of MakerDAO's DAI stablecoin is backed by USDC
63% of Hubble Protocol's USDH stablecoin is backed by USDC
70% of Angle's agEUR stablecoin is backed by USDC
93% of Hedge's USH stablecoin is backed by USDT and USDC
While using centralized stablecoins as collateral can help with peg stability, relying on them creates what is essentially a wrapped version of a centralized stablecoin, with added complexities and risks. The question arises: What happens if the centralized stablecoin issuer blacklists the address containing the collateral that backs a decentralized stablecoin?
Decentralized stablecoins often have high fees and minimums, low collateral ratio requirements, and misaligned incentives for users who aid in the protocol's operation.
Many decentralized stablecoins, particularly those using collateral-debt positions, often enforce high fees and minimums, which may dissuade user participation.
Many decentralized stablecoins operate with lower collateral ratio requirements to encourage borrowing and capital efficiency. Although beneficial in the immediate term, this approach could cause instability if the value of the underlying collateral experiences a swift decline.
In many stablecoin protocols that utilize collateral-debt positions, users participating in liquidations receive a small percentage of the collateral for their efforts. This may not provide enough incentive for users to take on the risk and responsibility of liquidation, especially amidst market volatility.
Most DAOs are predominantly controlled by a small group of token holders who possess a substantial amount of governance tokens. Take MakerDAO's on the proposed "Endgame Plan" as an example. The co-founder of the protocol was the biggest voter, and he was also the proposer of the proposal itself.
